Refuse, Resist, Contest

The 2024 elections, the balance of power, and the path ahead

Preface

The results of the November elections were devastating. Many of us are still reeling, even as we try to make sense of the changed conjuncture. What explains Trump’s victory? How has the balance of power shifted? And what will this mean for our tasks ahead? As a contribution to collectively addressing these urgent questions, Liberation Road offers the following provisional points of electoral analysis, conjunctural re-assessment, and strategic orientation. 

Contents

1. Executive Summary

2. Analysis: Why Trump Won

3. Analysis: Why Harris Loss

4. Assessment: Balance of Power

5. Strategy: Block, Broaden, Build

6. Implementation: Refuse, Resist, Contest

Executive Summary

Employing a classic fascist playbook, Trump manipulated economic frustration and social anxiety to mobilize voters against “enemies within”—immigrants, trans people, radical leftists and the “woke” deep state. These scapegoats were depicted as threats inside US society and simultaneously outside its (nativist, gendered) norms. Anti-trans and anti-immigrant messaging strengthened patriarchal and white racial coalitions, while making room for more non-white people, especially men. This right-populist grievance politics mobilized both the reliable Republican base and less frequent MAGA voters, while winning a small but statistically significant number of new and swing voters, particularly among young men and Latino men.  

While the Biden-Harris administration passed important pro-worker policies, they were unable to adequately address voters' direct economic concerns. Centrist Democrats’ unwillingness to name corporate power as the problem left them unable to offer a compelling counter to Trump’s right-populist narrative, which they in fact reinforced by staying quiet on trans issues and swinging right on immigration. Instead, Democrats put forward a vague and inconsistent narrative that downplayed race and gender identity as “divisive” issues, while courting a nonexistent moderate middle in ways that demoralized their own base. Harris’s failure to adequately address the genocide in Gaza alienated Arab and Muslim Americans, young people, and progressive voters. A strong ground game in the swing states—much of it led by progressive groups—partly compensated for these failures, but not enough to overtake Trump. Core Democratic voters turned out, but less reliable Democratic voters did not, although turnout levels remained consistent with 2020 levels in many swing states.  

Trump’s victory was wide, but weak; while its breadth reflects the structural crisis of neoliberalism, its weakness shows that MAGA has not yet consolidated a new hegemonic bloc. But MAGA’s control of all branches of the federal government greatly shifts the balance of power, dramatically increasing its chances of consolidating a new political power structure via a “slow motion coup.” We can expect Trump to act aggressively through the executive and must be prepared for grave abuses that could escalate the slide into fascism. Narrow House and Senate margins will place some hurdles on the GOP’s legislative agenda. But Trump will face few formal checks on immigration, deportations, and foreign policy, with potentially devastating effects both domestically and internationally. The balance of power is more favorable at the state level, which will be an important bulwark against authoritarianism. While MAGA is more prepared than in 2016, in some ways so are we. 

Strategically, the key tasks for left and progressive forces remain the same, albeit under much more challenging circumstances: to block the fascist right, broaden the anti-fascist front, and build the independent power and initiative of the left.

Since we failed to prevent MAGA forces from winning power, we must now exert all possible effort to block them from consolidating hegemony around their authoritarian project. To do so, we must work towards as broad an anti-fascist front as possible—engaging the masses, forging tactical alliances with a wide range of forces, and resisting the right’s attempts to fracture our coalition while exploiting divisions in their ranks. Simultaneously, we must rapidly build and strengthen a left trend capable of exerting greater leadership and power within the anti-fascist front—scaling our communications, connecting newly activated people to base-building opportunities, and increasing coordination among labor unions, independent political organizations (IPOs), elected allies, and progressive groups. 

These three tasks (block, broaden, build) will look different in red, blue, and purple states and contexts: in blue zones, we must refuse fascism; in red zones, resist fascism, and in purple zones contest against it. Balancing the trifold imperatives of block, broaden, and build across these diverse terrains of struggle will require much deeper coordination among and between progressive organizations and the socialist left, requiring us to break out of silos and resist sectarian tendencies. The course of our struggles will determine if this moment marks the birth of a new authoritarian order or its dying breath. 

Analysis: Why Trump Won

MAGA exploited frustration about economic inequality and fears of social, cultural, and demographic changes.

• Fascism bases its appeal on the economic hardships of the working and middle classes as well as on the status anxieties of relatively more privileged sectors in the face of pressure and advances from less privileged groups. 

• Economically, the abrupt cessation of COVID-era social assistance programs coincided with the onset of skyrocketing inflation, hitting the pocketbooks of working Americans already devastated by decades of soaring inequality under neoliberalism. 

• Socially, the ongoing diversification of society and the workforce stoked fears that gains for oppressed groups would come at the expense of white and male privilege, prompting increasing backlash against people of color, women, and LGBTQ+ people.

• Politically, the outbreak of global conflicts and intensifying natural disasters (neither of which the US government seemed able to adequately manage) exacerbated fears of instability and decline.

• All these dynamics increased anger, fear, and uncertainty among the masses, producing widespread discontent with the status quo.

MAGA targeted immigrants and trans people as scapegoats for these anxieties.

• Fascism projects widespread anxieties onto scapegoats that assume the blame for all societal problems. To be effective, fascist scapegoats must be both outside the society (a dangerous external threat) but also inside it (to explain inner tensions and divisions).

• Originating outside the borders of the United States, but living and working within it, immigrants were utilized as a scapegoat that could be framed as both “outside” and “inside” the body politic. Trans people were framed as being inside our schools, bathrooms, and sports teams, but bringing ideas and ways of being in the world that were falsely portrayed as alien and threatening to “traditional” families and gender roles. 

• Protestors, socialists, and “loony left radicals” were also portrayed as threats inside our schools, businesses, and communities who nonetheless bring ideas and lifeways dangerously outside the American norm—not least ideas about trans and immigrant rights, Palestinian self-determination, and broader social, racial, and gender equality.

• Democrats, “woke” generals, journalists, and government civil servants were depicted as vectors introducing these outside pathogens (immigrants, trans people, protestors and their dangerous ideas) deeper into civil society, schools, and government by means of the “deep state.”

Trump used anti-immigrant and anti-trans sentiment to strengthen white racial and patriarchal coalitions, while making room for more non-white people, especially men.

• Often depicted as “wedge” issues that divide Democratic voters, immigration and trans rights were instead used by Trump as “clamp” issues to restore and reconfigure patriarchal and racial coalitions in the face of changing demographics and social mores. 

• Appeals to white racial resentment have been a core component of Republican politics ever since Nixon and Goldwater pioneered the “Southern Strategy” in response to the civil rights victories of the 1960s. But amidst shifting demographics and social mores, direct appeals to white supremacy motivate a diminishing (if radicalized) voting base. 

• Trump weaponized racist vitriol to rally this core base, and expanded this white revanchist coalition by exploiting backlash to the 2020 Black Lives Matter uprisings, decrying “woke” efforts to rectify racial and other injustices that had gone “too far.” But anti-immigrant rhetoric allowed Trump to incorporate even some people of color into an expanded racist coalition, pitting US-born people of color against immigrants, older immigrant communities against newer ones; immigrants with papers against those without, and even some undocumented immigrants against others portrayed as less deserving. Trump’s attacks on immigrants thus simultaneously restored and reconfigured white grievance politics while inviting select non-white people into the fold.

• Likewise, patriarchy has been a core component of Republican politics since the New Right landed on anti-abortion (and, later, anti-gay) sentiments as key rallying cries beginning in the 1970s. But growing acceptance of LGBTQ+ and women’s rights sapped energy from this movement, while widespread backlash against the repeal of Roe v Wade threatened to fracture it more deeply. At the same time, other societal advances towards gender equality themselves provoked a revanchist patriarchal backlash, particularly in the wake of the #MeToo movement.

• Trump’s overt misogyny stoked this patriarchal backlash, which has now captured an increasing number of very young men radicalized through TikTok, YouTube, Reddit and X—an alt-right pipeline illustrated by the rapidly proliferating slogan “your body, my choice.” But anti-trans messaging allowed Trump to appeal to many who would be horrified by such overtly misogynistic rhetoric. Indeed, by maliciously depicting trans people as a threat to women’s rights, Trump was able to fuse a broadened “gender revanchist” coalition that appealed to both overt homophobes and male supremacists, covert misogynists, and some who would consider themselves staunch advocates of women’s and even LGB (but not T) equality. 

This right-populist politics mobilized both the reliable Republican base and less frequent MAGA voters, while winning over a small but statistically significant number of new and swing voters.

• Trump won virtually the entirety of the Republican base vote, with some 94% of registered Republicans voting for him, according to exit polls. In addition, the “expanded MAGA electorate” (infrequent voters who only vote when Trump is on the ballot) again came out for him. 

• Beyond the reliable Republican base vote and MAGA loyalists, Trump’s gains among other sectors of the electorate were relatively small. At the time of writing, he had gained a net increase of only 2.5 million votes over his 2020 totals—less than the 2.75 million third-party voters, and representing less than 2% of total votes cast.

• Within this net gain, Trump made inroads in rural, urban, and suburban areas, in almost all states, and among virtually all demographic groups—excepting Black women, college-educated voters, and white women. (While a majority of white women voted for Trump, they did so by a smaller margin than in 2020.) Of note were especially large increases among Latino men, men of all races under 30, and voters with household incomes in the $30,000-$100,00 range.

• These shifts bear further study, but their lasting significance should not be exaggerated. Direct comparisons with 2020 voting patterns can be misleading, as COVID-era voting practices were exceptional (particularly in states that temporarily instituted universal vote by mail). Because these shifts were general, no one demographic shift can be said to have “cost” Harris the election in isolation. And because these shifts were marginal, changes in the voting patterns of any particular group are less dramatic than they might at first appear.

• Despite talk of realignment, Trump’s 2024 victory mainly relied on the traditional voting base of the Republican party, which since 1968 has increasingly operated as a “white united front.” Trump mobilized these voters in large numbers and made slight gains with most other demographics, particularly Latino and young men. This, combined with static totals for Harris in the swing states and declining numbers nationally, was sufficient to allow Trump to carry all seven swing states and to win the popular vote by a narrow margin. 

Analysis: Why Harris Lost

While the Biden-Harris administration passed important pro-worker policies, it was unable to adequately address voters' direct economic concerns.

• Deep economic discontent was one of the driving forces in the election, with two-thirds of voters saying the economy was “not good” under Biden—part of a global trend of voters punishing whichever party was in power during the 2021-2023 inflation surge.

• Ironically, the Biden-Harris administration was widely considered the most pro-worker since FDR, with Biden pursuing aggressive pro-labor and pro-consumer policies through the executive and pushing for major new investment in jobs and infrastructure. These helped reduce income inequality and unemployment and created significant long-term macroeconomic benefits. 

• However, in the face of opposition from Republicans, corporate interests, and Senators Manchin and Sinema, Biden dropped most aspects of his economic stimulus plan that would have involved immediate, direct, and tangible benefits to working families, including the proposed $15 minimum wage, 12 weeks guaranteed paid sick leave, universal pre-K, and much more.

• Meanwhile, expanded COVID benefits expired in the middle of Biden’s term. Millions of Americans lost access to the child tax credit, temporary cash relief, and expanded unemployment, SNAP benefits, and Medicaid. The expiration of these benefits coincided with the onset of record inflation, which saw prices of gas, food, and core consumer goods skyrocket. So for many voters, Biden’s long-term public investments felt more distant than the visceral impact of higher prices and less direct governmental support. These perceptions were amplified by a right-wing media machine which endlessly trumpeted the message that the economy was worse. 

Centrist Democrats’ unwillingness to name corporate power as the problem left them unable to offer a compelling counter to Trump’s right-populist narrative, which they in fact reinforced by staying silent on trans issues and swinging right on immigration.

• The Biden (and, later, Harris) campaign could have addressed voters’ economic concerns with an unabashed left-populist narrative that placed the blame for higher costs directly where it belonged: on greedy corporations and the capitalist class. But centrist Democrats’ dependence on and deep relations with sectors of capital left them unwilling or unable to name corporate power as the problem. 

• As a result, Democrats were unable to provide a compelling counter-narrative to explain the cause of voters’ economic frustrations and anxieties. Where Trump’s story had a clear (racist and sexist) “us” and “them,” Harris’s story had only an “us.” Attempts to portray Trump and MAGA as the “them” were too easily dismissed as standard-issue politicking, inuring voters to the real threat Trump represented. Belated attempts to polarize around authoritarianism versus the rule of law, however accurate, were compelling for some voters but to others felt abstract and disconnected from their real concerns.

• This left Trump’s story largely uncontested: working families were suffering because the government was spending taxpayer money on illegal immigrants and gender transition surgery. Not only did Democrats fail to counter this narrative, in many ways they reinforced it. The Harris campaign stayed largely silent in the face of Trump’s anti-trans attacks, while the bulk of the party swung hugely to the right on immigration—effectively conceding MAGA’s point that the problem was migration. 

• This calculated move to the right likely proved costly. Campaigns elsewhere have shown that when centrist parties shift right in response to far-right rivals, voters typically reject such pseudo-nativism in favor of the real thing.

Instead, Democrats put forward a vague and inconsistent narrative, downplayed race and gender as “divisive” issues, and courted a non-existent moderate middle in ways that demoralized their own base.

• In the absence of a coherent campaign narrative, Harris resorted to the “popularism” made famous by David Shor, whose consulting firm was in fact put in charge of an “agenda-setting” $700 million PAC budget. Ostensibly eschewing “ideology,” this framework tailors campaign messaging to whatever issues poll best with the most people, while studiously avoiding those that poll less well. 

• This seemingly common-sense approach produces bland and incoherent messaging, gravitating towards the most vague and inoffensive talking points, while building a grab-bag platform out of whatever random issues poll the best, as opposed to proposing a coherent platform. The result is messaging that sounds vague and vacillating, attempting to be all things at once to all people—exactly the perception many voters had of Harris.  

• Two other weaknesses of such “popularism” were evident. First, its prioritization of the least “divisive” points leads to avoiding speaking directly about race, sexuality, and gender, out of fear that doing so will alienate some voters. This the Harris campaign largely did. Second, its prioritization of supposedly common-sense messaging errs in imagining a “mythical middle”—that is, a large block of voters clustered at the dead center of the polling average on every issue. In fact, few if any voters occupy this position. 

• As a result, Harris’s campaign exerted great effort courting a supposedly “moderate” centrist Republican voting base that, by and large, does not exist. Ideologically consistent moderates are a rare breed and (like most ideologically consistent voters) disproportionately politically active. Unsurprisingly then, Harris’s appeal to the moderate middle drew her the support of high-profile figures like Liz Cheney and over 200 other prominent (former) Republicans. But if these are leaders, they have few followers, and their endorsements failed to translate into any meaningful vote gain. Meanwhile, such appeals to the moderate middle risked alienating and demoralizing Harris’s own core voting base.  

Harris’s failure to adequately address the genocide in Gaza alienated Arab and Muslim Americans, young people, and progressive voters. 

• The US’s enabling of the ongoing genocide in Gaza weighed heavily across this entire campaign cycle. It is unclear to what extent Harris could have influenced the foreign policy decisions of President Biden (or for that matter how much Biden can influence Netanyahu). And Harris’s ability to speak boldly on the issue was constrained by the electoral risks of being labeled anti-Israel amid the current limitations of US foreign policy debates and the pervasive influence of AIPAC. 

• Even within these constraints, however, Harris could and should have spoken out much more boldly. Statements of compassion and unending claims to be “working tirelessly for a ceasefire” grew ever more hollow in the face of unending genocide. In particular, the decision to deny an Uncommitted speaker a slot at the Democratic National Convention was both morally and strategically wrong—a fatal error that lost her the Uncommitted Movement, Muslims for Harris, and perhaps her last chance to win back voters for whom the war in genocide was a decisive issue. 

• For the vast majority of voters, unfortunately, the genocide appears to have had limited direct impact on their vote. But it decisively lost Harris the support of Arab and Muslim voters. It undoubtedly cost her some portion of the youth vote as well, perhaps less in terms of losing votes to Trump (or even to third parties) than in voters simply staying home—no small matter in an election where youth voter turnout declined substantially.

• Perhaps the most significant electoral impact, however, was on the party’s activist base. Progressive, highly politically active young people, while a relatively small portion of the total swing state voter base, form a high proportion of the volunteer base—leading campus canvasses, signing up for door and phone banking shifts, taking on paid staff roles on candidate campaigns, etc. The losses here are harder to calculate than direct vote loss, but potentially more impactful.   

A strong ground game in the swing states—much of it led by progressive groups—partly compensated for these failures, but not enough to overtake Trump.

• Our front mounted a strong ground game in the seven swing states, some of it run through the Harris campaign and the Democratic Party, but much of it carried out by left-led IPOs, community organizations, and progressive labor—all generally more effective messengers than party staffers “parachuting” in for election season, with little place-based context. In many swing states, left and progressive IPOs scaled up their infrastructure and voter engagement, and increased coordination with each other and with national networks like Seed the Vote. 

• All this demonstrably impacted voter turnout in swing states. Where most other states saw sharp declines in Democratic turnout compared to 2020, in the seven swing states turnout largely held steady—and in Georgia and North Carolina, even increased. But although this strong ground game undoubtedly boosted Harris’s swing state totals by several points, it was unable to overcome the headwinds caused by the other factors outlined here. Doors and phones can be decisive on the margins, but cannot alone compensate for dramatic underperformance in public opinion, media narrative, and campaign “air wars” (TV ads, etc). In this regard, the contradiction here was that, while progressive organizations handled much of the voter engagement strategy on the ground, they had little to no control over the air.

• In down-ballot races, IPOs and progressive candidates had much greater success, turning blue states bluer and flipping key state races in red and purple states. In contested Congressional districts, Democratic candidates overperformed Harris by an average of almost 3 points, helping stave off losses in the House and Senate.  

Amidst these factors, core Democratic voters turned out, but less reliable Democratic voters did not, although turnout levels remained consistent with 2020 in many swing states. 

• It must be stressed that the messaging and policy errors outlined above are largely structural failures of the centrist Democratic establishment, not individual failures of Kamala Harris, who inherited a difficult situation with a scant three months notice and generally proved a competent campaigner. Harris’s entrance into the race galvanized the Democratic voting base, brought new energy to a flailing campaign, and motivated voters understandably excited about electing America’s first Black, Asian woman president. Nor can we forget the role of many factors (from global inflation, to the online radicalization of young men, to misogyny and racial bias) largely outside her control.  

• Amidst these varied factors, core Democratic voters still mobilized in large numbers. Harris won 95% of Democratic voters, according to exit polls, and at the time of writing had secured 74 million votes—higher than the 2012 Obama total in both raw numbers and as a proportion of registered voters, and only slightly below his record win in 2008. Viewed in this light her performance was not particularly bad. 

• Compared to 2020, however, net Democratic voters declined by some 7 million nationally. The reasons for this decline are complex and multifaceted. In addition to the factors outlined above, we must consider Republicans' efforts to suppress the vote through new voter ID laws, voter roll purges, and other measures, and the exceptional nature of the 2020 COVID election. 

• In general, Harris performed well with core Democratic constituencies, including Black and other oppressed nationality voters, young women, and unmarried white women. She overperformed with college-educated voters, but underperformed with Latino men.

• Demographically the youth vote showed one of the largest swings, especially among young men. However, this was primarily due to a steep decline in votes for Harris, which was not matched by a comparable increase for Trump. Overall youth voters turned out in much lower numbers than in 2020. (But notably 2020 was an exceptional year for youth voter turnout, with many college-age voters sheltering at home with their parents, and many ballots mailed directly to them.)

Assessment: Balance of Power

Trump’s victory was wide, but weak; while its breadth reflects the structural crisis of neoliberalism, its weakness shows that MAGA has not yet consolidated a new hegemonic bloc around an alternative political power structure.

• Despite Trump’s claims, this election does not represent a political realignment… yet. Although Trump swept the seven swing states, he secured less than 50% of the popular vote and his margin of victory is one of the lowest in US history. His win was wide, but weak. 

• Realigning elections are ones that bring sharp changes in the regional and demographic power base of party coalitions, resulting in a new political power structure that lasts for decades. Examples in the US include the 1932 and 1980 elections. 

• In 1932, Roosevelt won 89% of electoral college votes and gained his party 90 seats in the House and nine in the Senate. This led to the New Deal and ushered in a period of Keynesian hegemony that lasted until the economic and political crises of the 1970s. 

• In 1980, Ronald Reagan won 91% of electoral college votes and gained his party 34 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate. This led to the “Reagan Revolution” and ushered in a period of neoliberal hegemony that lasted until the 2008 economic crisis.

• In contrast, Trump won only 58% of electoral college votes, gained four Senate seats (on terrain widely viewed as unfavorable to Senate Democrats) and has secured one new net House seat at the time of writing. As things stand, this does not give Trump the popular mandate for a fundamental realignment of US politics. 

But MAGA’s control of all branches of the federal government greatly shifts the balance of power, increasing the risk that they will establish a right-wing authoritarian regime by force, fiat, and “slow motion coup.” 

• Our pre-election analysis argued that MAGA forces were attempting a “slow-motion coup” to cement America as a right-wing authoritarian state dominated by a patriarchal white Christian nationalist movement and the most reactionary, nativist sectors of the US capitalist class. This election has brought them dangerously closer to that objective. 

• Trump’s threats of deploying military units against civilians, constructing mass detention camps, weaponizing the judiciary to attack his “enemies,” and invoking broad emergency powers are all signals of an attempted authoritarian takeover that does not yet have anything close to a popular mandate, but faces few formal impediments. 

• With control of the House and Senate and a far-right Supreme Court majority who have granted him virtually unchecked personal immunity, Trump will face few formal political or legal checks on his executive agenda. We have already seen him attempt to increase his control over the Department of Justice, the intelligence community, and the US military—precisely the components of the repressive state apparatus whose loyalty would be needed in order to facilitate a broader authoritarian takeover.

• Rather than the electoral realignments of 1932 or 1980, the better parallel for this attempted takeover is Redemption—the reactionary movement by post-Civil War Southern elites to “redeem” the South and overturn mulitracial democracy through propaganda, voter suppression, state repression, and military and paramilitary force, the climax of which was the violent 1898 coup in Wilmington, North Carolina. We should recall that Trump himself facilitated an attempted coup in the 2020 elections, the results of which he still continues to deny, and has faced no consequences for these actions only due to legal delays and the right-wing’s stacking of the courts.  

We can expect Trump to act aggressively through the executive and must be prepared for grave abuses that could escalate the slide into fascism.

• In 2016 Trump was caught off guard; this time he and his transition team are more prepared. We can expect Trump to use the powers of the executive immediately and aggressively, and to face few impediments to his cabinet and judicial appointments.

• Based on what we know already, there are many areas where Trump will likely act immediately, from militarizing the border to freezing key components of Biden’s climate agenda. These actions will come quickly and may dismay and demoralize us; indeed, that will be part of their point.

• Beyond these, there are other potential actions Trump could attempt that would mark dramatic points of escalation. Because every action has an opposite reaction, these would simultaneously escalate our slide into authoritarianism and increase the depth and breadth of pushback, offering openings for us to expand the anti-facist front. 

• Below is an outline of some of these points of anticipated executive action and potential escalation. 

Narrow House and Senate margins will place some hurdles on the GOP’s legislative agenda.

• Narrow margins will impede the GOP’s ability to legislate. We already saw in the last session that the unruly and divided Republican House majority had trouble unifying to pass legislation. Under a Trump presidency they may prove less fractious, but narrow majorities will still pose challenges for them.

• More importantly, the lack of a 60-vote, filibuster-proof supermajority will constrain the GOP in the Senate. While the filibuster itself can be changed or eliminated by a simple majority vote, Republican Senate leadership have stated they will retain it. Assuming they do so, almost all major legislation will require the support of at least seven Democrats, as well as the full GOP Caucus. Centrist Democrats and the few remaining moderate Senate Republicans, like Collins and Murkowski, will play a critical role.   

• The Senate can approve judicial and cabinet appointments by a simple majority vote. They can also pass tax, spending, and debt limit bills through budget reconciliation. We can expect dramatic cuts to taxes and, perhaps, entitlement programs. They may try to append larger policy changes to budget reconciliation, but this can be blocked. 

But Trump will face few formal checks on immigration, deportations, and foreign policy, with potentially devastating effects both domestically and internationally.

• Trump has repeatedly broadcast his intention to deport and detain millions of immigrants and “undesirables.” While financial and procedural constraints may slow him down, he faces few formal obstacles and diminishing social and political opposition, as both elected officials and the general public have shifted right amid concerted anti-immigrant propaganda. At best, we are looking at a return to the draconian policies of the first Trump administration; at worst, the detention and deportation of tens of millions of immigrants—itself furthering the conditions for the broader construction of a police state. 

• Internationally, we can expect Trump to further enable and indeed encourage Israeli genocide, ethnic cleansing, and expropriation, not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank, potentially including abandoning even nominal US support for a two-state solution in favor of outright Israeli annexation. While Trump’s intentions in Europe are less clear, there is also a risk he will facilitate Russian annexation of significant sections of Ukraine. 

• Trump has also pledged to impose foreign-trade tariffs. These would likely create severe contractions and rising prices for both the US and global economy, and will be resisted by sectors of capital. But Trump faces few formal checks on his ability to impose tariffs. Likewise, as commander-in-chief he has few formal checks on his military orders. 

The balance of power is more favorable at the state level, which will be an important bulwark against authoritarianism. 

• The federated structure of the US means that states possess many powers, both to direct their own internal affairs and to resist directives from the federal government. In the past, the right has used this to their advantage, pursuing a long-term state-based power-building strategy. Now, in states under Democratic control, the federated powers of the states will be one of our greatest political bulwarks against authoritarianism.

• In 2016, the GOP held 26 state trifectas to the Democrats’ six, with the rest under divided control. Today, the GOP controls 23, while Democrats control 15. In both states and cities under Democratic control, we will need to use the tools of government to resist authoritarianism.

• Electorally, state level election results presented a rosier picture in 2024. Many states under Democratic control (such as Washington and Connecticut) either increased the size of state legislative majorities, elected more progressive Democrats, or both, while some red and purple states broke GOP supermajorities or won key statewide races. Left-led IPOs and progressive groups drove many of these victories. 

While MAGA is more prepared than in 2016, in some ways so are we. 

• Trump and MAGA are more prepared than in 2016 to take advantage of their victory:

  • Both the Republican party leadership and base are much more deeply consolidated around a neo-fascist agenda, while their appointment of over 200 federal judges makes it less likely that the judicial branch will provide checks.

  • From the Washington Post to X, almost every key media outlet is now owned by billionaires, providing fewer bulwarks against the growing right-wing media echo chamber. 

  • In 2016, small margins, shock and outrage, and Trump’s clear lack of a popular vote majority contributed to high levels of mobilization, protest, and counter-organizing. Today, there is a greater risk of resignation and collaboration. 

• At the same time, pro-democracy forces also have some greater strengths than in 2016:

  • Many state and local officials have strengthened mechanisms to protect against federal overreach, both during Trump’s first term and in anticipation of a possible second. 

  • Through Project 2025 and elsewhere, MAGA forces have broadcast their agenda, increasing our ability to anticipate and prepare against their moves. 

  • Finally, a somewhat stronger and more coherent left-progressive trend has begun to emerge. The Congressional Progressive Caucus is larger and capable of exerting more influence than in 2016, we have a much larger bench of progressive candidates at the state level, our IPOs have increased their size and scope, and there is an increased level of coordination among IPOs, NGOs, and progressive labor. 

Strategic Orientation: Block, Broaden, Build 

Since we were unable to prevent MAGA from winning power, we must now exert all possible effort to block it from consolidating hegemony around its authoritarian project.

• The greatest risk is that MAGA will manage through a combination of violent repression and distribution of privilege to obtain the consent or acquiescence of sufficient forces to secure hegemony and establish a new long-term governing paradigm.¹ We are in a moment of deep structural crisis for the most recent hegemonic paradigm, neoliberalism. Virtually all sectors of society—including the ruling class—are uncertain about how to restore equilibrium. If MAGA manages to convince enough forces that its agenda offers a path to stability and prosperity, they may consolidate a new hegemonic bloc that could dominate US politics, economy, and society for decades to come. 

• But while MAGA forces have won trifecta control of the federal government, they have not yet consolidated a hegemonic bloc around their social, political, and economic agenda. Many of their ideas are deeply unpopular, and the “common sense” remains highly contested. With total control of the levers of federal government, they may be able to impose major portions of their agenda by force and fiat; but without the consent of key social forces, they will not be able to consolidate their control. 

• Accordingly, the most critical task for the coming period will be to prevent MAGA from consolidating hegemony around its political project. With few formal political levers under our control, our ability to do so will depend on concerted, coordinated opposition and resistance from all across society—including organized labor, social movements, churches and faith communities, students and universities, culture and media figures, civil servants, military members, and even sectors of capital. 

To block MAGA from consolidating their project, we must construct as broad an anti-fascist front as possible—engaging the masses, forging tactical alliances with a wide range of forces, and resisting the right’s attempts to fracture our coalition while exploiting divisions in their ranks.

• The good news is that there are many forces within and across all these social sectors who oppose the MAGA agenda or can be won over to our ranks. From black bloc anarchists to retired military generals, student radicals to soccer moms, immigrant rights groups to small business owners, the range of forces currently or potentially opposed to Trump’s authoritarian agenda is quite broad. 

• As these examples show, however, the contradictions within this broad anti-fascist front are many, and MAGA will attempt to exploit these deep differences to divide our front and conquer our forces one by one. Our ability to block MAGA will depend, in part, on our ability to keep together this heterogeneous coalition around the key points that unite us: our commitment to uphold democratic institutions, civil rights, and free and fair elections; to oppose right-wing political violence; and to defend those targeted by the state from persecution.

• Where differences threaten to fracture our coalition’s ability to oppose fascism, we must subordinate them to these key points of unity: defense of civil society, civil liberties, and civil rights. Where elements of our coalition waffle on these key points, we must reorient them to the stakes and reorganize them to our side. Because fascists always start by targeting the “weak points” where they perceive our front as most vulnerable, it will be especially important to maintain unity around defense of fascism’s first targets: immigrants, trans people, and other “enemies within” singled out for attack. 

• We must also exploit divisions within the fascist front to weaken them and win more forces to our side. The “chainsaw” Elon Musk wants to take to the federal budget would wreak deep pain on middle-class MAGA supporters. The millions of deportations the latter are clamoring for will be fiercely resisted by sectors of capital. Deploying the military domestically will alienate institutionalists, including within the military. Points of escalation by Trump and MAGA forces, while increasing the threat of authoritarianism, also sow alarm and division in their ranks, representing opportunities to deepen resistance, draw weak allies closer to us, and win over middle forces. 

Simultaneously, we must rapidly build and strengthen a left trend capable of exerting greater leadership and power within the anti-fascist front: scaling our communications, connecting newly activated people to base-building opportunities, and increasing coordination among labor unions, IPOs, mass-based social movement organizations (especially among people of color), elected allies, and progressive groups. 

• Even as we work to strengthen the broadest possible anti-fascist front, we must work to increase the power, influence, and leadership of the left within it. The failure of the centrist Democratic establishment to successfully defeat Trump demonstrates the paucity of their ideas and the limits of their leadership—and offers left and progressive forces an opportunity to increase ours. We can't predict how centrist Democrats will respond to Trump’s provocations; already we see a range of reactions from resistance to collaboration. What we do know is that there will be fierce battles among Democrats—both over the narrative of the 2024 election, and the correct tactics and strategy in the many fights before us—and that our forces will need to directly engage the centrists in a bid for greater influence.

• The left should develop better communications infrastructure and put forward a clear vision, program, and strategy that can help our people make meaning of this moment. Hundreds of thousands are looking to make sense of this loss, to understand the changed terrain, and to reorient to the tasks ahead. It is crucial that we contest against the backward ideas, not only of fascist forces, but of a centrist establishment incapable of offering a compelling alternative that meets the real needs and interests of the people.

• Left organizations should hold mass meetings to bring in many people activated by the centrist-led defeat—and utilize these as a springboard to connect them to ongoing organizing. We need to harness this and future moments of activation and mobilization to connect people to the durable, long-term, place-based organizing necessary to fight fascism and build a left alternative. 

• The left must push for greater alignment between labor unions, IPOs, elected allies, progressive groups, and mass-based social movement organizations (especially of oppressed genders and oppressed people of color). All the components of the progressive and socialist left will be necessary in the two-pronged fight ahead. But without greater collaboration and coordination among them, we will be unable to form a pole powerful enough to contest against both fascist forces and the backward centrist leadership of our anti-fascist front. Some have already started discussing the need for leftists and progressives to cohere around a single presidential candidate in 2028. If we are to coordinate such a major intervention, the seeds must be sown through multiple smaller intervening tactical and strategic collaborations beginning right now—around messaging, actions and protests, campaigns, and more. 

Applying the Strategy: Refuse, Resist, Contest  

These three tasks (block, broaden and build) will look different in red, blue, and purple states and regions: in blue zones, we must refuse fascism; in red zones, resist fascism, and in purple zones contest fascism.  

• In states, cities and regions under Democratic control, we must refuse fascism, creating sanctuaries and refuges where we have the power to say “this will not happen here.” In these places, we must both enshrine and defend existing rights (around abortion access, trans-affirming healthcare, immigrant justice, civil liberties, democracy, and more) and simultaneously push for bolder, transformative policies that can provide an alternative governing paradigm to masses of people rightly disillusioned by the failures of neoliberalism.   

• In states, cities, and regions under MAGA control, we must resist fascism. This includes protecting our communities through rightful resistance tactics and community self-defense; creating alternative institutions that can provide mutual aid and community care; and using cultural resistance, protest, and acts of civil disobedience large and small to rally our people and win over public opinion. Even as we organize to build and lead the multiracial pro-democracy front in these areas, we must take advantage of opportunities to bring in centrist and working class Republicans disillusioned by MAGA rule. 

• In states, cities, and regions that are “swing” districts or under divided rule, we must contest fascism. Because we know that short-term parachute campaigns cannot organize the durable majorities needed to elect and protect pro-democracy candidates and decisively defeat MAGA, the work of organizing towards 2026 and 2028 elections begins now. Labor unions should target these areas for deep worker organizing; community-based groups should run issue fights; IPOs should begin prospecting, recruiting and training candidates; sitting electeds should engage their voter base year-round; and all of these efforts should be synergized and coordinated. 

• These three terrains are not mutually exclusive. Deep blue states contain contested districts decisive to control of Congress. Deep red states have progressive regions that can become safe havens and sanctuaries. In places gridlocked at the state legislative level, both sides strive to shift the balance of power by contesting for control of county commissioners and school boards. 

• At the national level, we are all now living in the equivalent of a red state. That means movements that have been organizing for years in red states and regions are now our best experts on how to organize within and against fascist rule. People in major metros and deep-blue states sometimes forget that MAGA-dominated states in the South and Southwest contain some of the largest concentrations of Black, Indigenous, and Latine communities, the liveliest social movements, and the longest lineages of struggle. Now is a good time to listen to and learn from them. 

Balancing the trifold imperatives of block, broaden, and build across these diverse terrains of struggle will require much deeper coordination among and between progressive organizations and the socialist left, requiring us to break out of silos and resist sectarian tendencies.

• In talking of “building the left,” some have asked whether we mean building progressive mass membership organizations, or whether we mean building socialist organization and the party left. In a word—yes. We think that both are important, that the two are distinct, and that there is a dialectical relation between the two.

• Building and cohering mass membership organizations is crucial if we are to engage in social struggle at the scale needed to win majorities away from MAGA and towards emancipatory alternatives. Indeed, the weakness of mass organization and the isolation and atomization of our people is one of the key factors undergirding the rise of Trump. At the same time, any authentically mass organization will contain wildly differing ideas reflecting the wide range of beliefs and opinions among the people at this current stage of struggle. While some mass organizations possess left leadership, few are mass left organizations, precisely because we have not yet won the working-class masses to socialism.

• For this reason, building and coordinating socialist organization is also necessary. The tasks of blocking fascism, broadening the anti-fascist front, and building the left are multifarious and complex. To succeed at them, we need socialist organizations to develop and resource leaders who can support our mass organizations in developing and implementing strategy by practicing mass line. That means gathering the diverse ideas of the people, concentrating them in light of the long-term struggle and a scientific analysis of the objective situation, and returning those concentrated ideas in the form of a political program that can energize and mobilize our forces for the fight ahead. 

• To simplify, we might say that, if mass organization strengthens our ability to win the democratic struggle in our society, socialist organization strengthens our ability to win the democratic struggle inside our mass organizations—orienting our mass movements with a long-term vision embedded in the battles of the present.   

• The tasks ahead of us are enormous, and no single one of our organizations or formations can be successful in isolation. Just as our ability to defeat the fascist right depends on maintaining unity across a heterogeneous anti-fascist front containing both left and centrist forces, so too our ability to successfully vie with centrist forces for greater leadership within that front will depend on a unified and coordinated effort from across the progressive and socialist left. Indeed, precisely because we need to successfully balance those two struggles, our unity is doubly important. 

• All organizations have impulses to silo, and the socialist left has additional structural tendencies towards sectarianism. We must combat what Mao called the “mountain stronghold mentality” in which each compact unit of struggle, cut off and isolated from the others, comes to view itself as the vanguard or the resistance. 

The course of our struggles will determine if this moment marks the birth of a new authoritarian order or its dying breath. 

• The structural failures of neoliberalism and the three-fold crisis of economy, ecology, and empire have created an opening—an interregnum—where different forces compete to determine what will follow. The fight is so intense precisely because we are in a period where dramatic change is possible.

• Across the world, authoritarian forces are trying to orchestrate a “right exit” to neoliberalism. But the ability of the left-wing Morena party in Mexico to win and deepen majorities in this year of electoral turbulence shows that a “left exit” from neoliberalism can be achieved.

• With trifecta control of the federal government, fascist forces have seized the strategic advantage and dramatically shifted the balance of forces. But the degree to which they have consolidated their position should not be overstated. 

• The last time Republicans won the popular vote, in 2004, they were swept out of office four years later. The time before that, in the 1980s, they swept in a new hegemonic project that dominated US and global politics, economics, and society for decades to come.

• Historians may look back on 2024 as the year that established a new cycle of white Christian nationalist rule, or as the midpoint of a much longer interim period of inconclusive stalemate… or as the moment that marked the apotheosis of right authoritarianism and the birth pangs of an emancipatory political period where huge advances were rapidly made.  

• The course of our struggles, and the question of how massive and well-organized our resistance is, will help determine which of these (or other) futures comes to be. 

1. Hegemony occurs when a dominant class fraction is able to secure enough support from other classes and key social forces to establish broad consent around a governing paradigm—a framework for how government, the economy, and society operate, combined with a set of policies capable of carrying it out. The ideas, values, and policies of the dominant group become widely accepted as natural or common-sense, making alternatives appear outlandish, impossible, or even inconceivable.