I am not arguing that we are in a situation like Russia circa 1905, or 1917. It is more like 1913 or 1914.
I am arguing that at a global scale, the uni-polar (neo-liberal) system is in deep crisis with implications at all scales.
I view things through a China lens.
President Xi noted that we are witnessing changes unseen for a century as the uni-polar system unravels.
Despite changes in administration, there is a continuity of agenda in US foreign policy that will eventually lead to more regional or perhaps a global war.
The United States’ heightened focus on China under the second Trump administration is not a break from the past but rather a natural evolution of policies initiated under Obama, Trump, and Biden.
Trump’s first administration, for example, escalated economic pressure on China through trade restrictions and targeted measures against Huawei (Reuters, 2019).
Likewise, Biden extended and reinforced regional alliances and reshaped military strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
The second Trump administration’s prioritization of the Indo-Pacific follows the same trajectory, emphasizing the need to deter “China’s expansionism” while disengaging from prolonged land wars in Europe (BBC, 2023).
The current administration is also focusing on enhancing the U.S. Air Force’s missile defense capabilities in preparation for the coming confrontation (Defense News, 2024).
Washington’s support for Taiwan separtists remains unwavering, reflecting a bipartisan consensus on bolstering Taiwan’s defenses against potential Chinese “aggression”
even though the one-China policy is the foundation for US-China relations (U.S. Department of State, 2024).
While the rhetoric of different administrations may fluctuate, the fundamental strategy remains centered on smashing Russia and Iran while containing Chinese influence and ensuring U.S. dominance in the Pacific.
Mackinder’s Heartland theory (1904) applies here: by controlling the Rimland (the coastal regions surrounding Eurasia), the U.S. seeks to contain China’s rise and Eurasian economic integration.
Brenner’s concept of re-scaling helps explain how the U.S. is shifting from a globally dominant force to a manager of regional hegemonies, transferring more security responsibilities to allies while maintaining overall control (Brenner, 2004).
Repression at home compliments the drive to war abroad as typical of classical fascisms. It was delusional to think that Trump was the "peace candidate".
The block and build strategy is a foundation for a united front in a period that will likely be characterized as one of repression and war.
References
BBC. (2023). How US Marines are being reshaped for China threat.
Brenner, N. (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford University Press.
Reuters. (2019). Trump administration hits China’s Huawei with one-two punch.
VOA. (2019). Why Trump has gotten extra tough in monitoring China at sea.
Defense News. (2024). US Air Force eyes missile defense for dispersed bases in China fight.
U.S. Department of State. (2024). U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal.
All the best, Bennett! I agree about the relevance of Poulantzas. I would note that a socialist defense of bourgeois democracy is a conditional defense. It means using every inch of democratic space to organize, while making clear that only socialism can secure and expand freedom.
As Lenin wrote in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, pinkos must participate in bourgeois parliaments, not because they believe in the institutions themselves, but because the masses of people still do. Organizers must go where the people are, including electoral spaces, trade unions, and popular movements, in order to expose the limits of bourgeois democracy and build the capacity for rupture.
We need to avoid “Kautskyite” illusions: imagining that authoritarianism can be staved off by refining institutions, defending civil society, or appealing to legal norms. Lenin, in The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918), condemned this position Maintaining the sanctity of liberal institutions in times of crisis amounted, to providing left cover for the bourgeoisie at the moment when a transformational rupture was necessary and maybe even daresay possible. I would also argue that the reaction appearing at the global scale is symptomatic of the erosion of U.S. imperial hegemony and the shift in the global order. The economic basis of the U.S. shifted from industrial capital to speculative finance, from productive dominance to crisis management. Trump’s rejection of liberal multilateralism and embrace of America First is a predictable consequence of imperial decline. The appeal of strongman rule, informal networks, and the breakdown of administrative capacity reflects the contradictions of late-stage imperialism.
Ok but 1) we are far from a revolutionary rupture in a socialist sense (though closer in a fascist one!) and 2) in a US context any process of social transformation will need to entail a dialectical deepening of democracy both inside the state and in civil society (including economic democracy!). Meaning "democracy" in the most literal sense of "people power." The conditions of Tsarist Russia circa 1917 are not those of the United States in 2025.
If we are looking for historical analogies, a much more apt example of what a socialist "transformational rupture" looks like in a US context is post Civil War Reconstruction.
Bennett and LRN folks, an A+ for putting the pieces together and coming up with patronal autocracy. I had concluded earlier this year and published on my Bpress site as an "unpublished paper" my own taxonomy, on which I've been working academically since 2008, that my row five should be called Patrimonialism, and there are versions of it on the right, moderate/liberal, progressive and left. Trump is in box 17, but per Poulantzas there are "regions" of the state, and your work like mind is imperfect in that is is part a typology of ideology and part an typology of state forms, but the state is not unitary. In the present administration, Vance with his backer Thiel is in box 5 but he has "extraconstitutional" tendencies and may end up in box 13, or Trump plus Vance may end up with the administration in box 13, not wanna be fascist but actually fascist. The danger is real. Dover, M. A. (2025 [2008]). Reconceptualizing the Political Spectrum with A Taxonomy of Five Versions of Conservative, Moderate/Liberal, Progressive and Left Ideology: Utopianism, Libertarianism, Pragmatism, Authoritarianism and Patrimonialism https://works.bepress.com/michael-dover/95/
The concept of “patronal autocracy” helps describe recent authoritarian trends, particularly the personalization of power and the erosion of liberal norms. However, this framework is limited by its liberal assumptions, which treat authoritarianism as a breakdown of institutional norms rather than as a structural response to crisis within capitalism. It does not engage the core insights of Marxist theory or confront the explicitly fascist theorists who shaped modern authoritarianism. Carl Schmitt, a Nazi jurist and open fascist, argued that sovereignty lies in the power to decide on the exception, not in adherence to legal norms. His theory shows how fascism emerges not outside liberalism, but from within it by suspending legality in moments of crisis. In this light, Trump’s contempt for bureaucracy, rule by loyalty, and disregard for institutional independence are not deviations but logical expressions of liberal constitutionalism under stress.
At the same time, it might be more accurate to understand Trumpism not as fully realized fascism but as a variant of proto-fascism. Like historical fascist movements, it mobilizes the petty bourgeoisie and disoriented sectors of the working class through racialized nationalism, authoritarian populism, and anti-left demagoguery. However, it lacks the disciplined mass party structure, totalitarian aspirations, and fully articulated ideological program of classical fascism. In this sense, Trumpism echoes what Togliatti described as fascism’s early phase, where bourgeois democracy is still used as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation . Some have described such formations as “illiberal democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” or “soft authoritarianism,” but these terms often downplay the class content of what is unfolding. Fascism is not a style of governance but a specific mode of capitalist rule that emerges in a time of crisis.
Lenin insisted that the state, whether democratic or authoritarian in form, is always an instrument of class domination. From this perspective, Trumpism’s ideological incoherence is a strength, not a weakness. It allows the movement to serve capital flexibly while mobilizing a mass base through culture war, conspiracy, and revanchist nationalism. What appears inconsistent from a liberal standpoint is, from a another perspective, the functional ideology of crisis capitalism.
Strategies that rely on liberal institutions, civil society, or procedural guardrails fail to reckon with the class nature of the state. Fascism often grows with the passive support or active collaboration of liberal elites. Preventing its consolidation requires more than defending democracy in the abstract. It demands the construction of a revolutionary project rooted in working-class power. Power that can offer not just resistance to creeping fascism, but an alternative to capitalism itself.
Thanks for this Steve! Will try and respond in more depth later, but quickly: I agree there are limitations to the "class blindness" of many political science-based taxonomies of authoritarianism, patronalization, autocracy, etc - I tried to at least briefly address them in the article.
I appreciate you distinguishing "phases" of fascism. Some of the arguments around "is Trump fascist?" (which I confess I've found tiring) have tended to revolve around an either/or, black-or-white framework. All of which to say, we need a taxonomy of stages of fascism as well. And I think we agree that Trumpism is certainly in some stage of attempted fascism. We might quibble about exactly which/where but that's a subject for another post.
We need to supplement Lein with Poulantzas: the state is a terrain of class struggle, and its internal fissures and balance of power reflect that of the broader social struggle. So overly straightforward to call is simply an object of domination. The defense of the democratic institutions is also partially a defense of the (limited) gains that the movements of workers, people of color and oppressed groups were able to make, as reflected within the state. So we cannot divorce defense of liberal institutions, civil society, etc from the kind of struggle you're talking about.
I am not arguing that we are in a situation like Russia circa 1905, or 1917. It is more like 1913 or 1914.
I am arguing that at a global scale, the uni-polar (neo-liberal) system is in deep crisis with implications at all scales.
I view things through a China lens.
President Xi noted that we are witnessing changes unseen for a century as the uni-polar system unravels.
Despite changes in administration, there is a continuity of agenda in US foreign policy that will eventually lead to more regional or perhaps a global war.
The United States’ heightened focus on China under the second Trump administration is not a break from the past but rather a natural evolution of policies initiated under Obama, Trump, and Biden.
Trump’s first administration, for example, escalated economic pressure on China through trade restrictions and targeted measures against Huawei (Reuters, 2019).
Likewise, Biden extended and reinforced regional alliances and reshaped military strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific.
The second Trump administration’s prioritization of the Indo-Pacific follows the same trajectory, emphasizing the need to deter “China’s expansionism” while disengaging from prolonged land wars in Europe (BBC, 2023).
The current administration is also focusing on enhancing the U.S. Air Force’s missile defense capabilities in preparation for the coming confrontation (Defense News, 2024).
Washington’s support for Taiwan separtists remains unwavering, reflecting a bipartisan consensus on bolstering Taiwan’s defenses against potential Chinese “aggression”
even though the one-China policy is the foundation for US-China relations (U.S. Department of State, 2024).
While the rhetoric of different administrations may fluctuate, the fundamental strategy remains centered on smashing Russia and Iran while containing Chinese influence and ensuring U.S. dominance in the Pacific.
Mackinder’s Heartland theory (1904) applies here: by controlling the Rimland (the coastal regions surrounding Eurasia), the U.S. seeks to contain China’s rise and Eurasian economic integration.
Brenner’s concept of re-scaling helps explain how the U.S. is shifting from a globally dominant force to a manager of regional hegemonies, transferring more security responsibilities to allies while maintaining overall control (Brenner, 2004).
Repression at home compliments the drive to war abroad as typical of classical fascisms. It was delusional to think that Trump was the "peace candidate".
The block and build strategy is a foundation for a united front in a period that will likely be characterized as one of repression and war.
References
BBC. (2023). How US Marines are being reshaped for China threat.
Brenner, N. (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford University Press.
Reuters. (2019). Trump administration hits China’s Huawei with one-two punch.
VOA. (2019). Why Trump has gotten extra tough in monitoring China at sea.
Defense News. (2024). US Air Force eyes missile defense for dispersed bases in China fight.
U.S. Department of State. (2024). U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal.
All the best, Bennett! I agree about the relevance of Poulantzas. I would note that a socialist defense of bourgeois democracy is a conditional defense. It means using every inch of democratic space to organize, while making clear that only socialism can secure and expand freedom.
As Lenin wrote in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, pinkos must participate in bourgeois parliaments, not because they believe in the institutions themselves, but because the masses of people still do. Organizers must go where the people are, including electoral spaces, trade unions, and popular movements, in order to expose the limits of bourgeois democracy and build the capacity for rupture.
We need to avoid “Kautskyite” illusions: imagining that authoritarianism can be staved off by refining institutions, defending civil society, or appealing to legal norms. Lenin, in The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (1918), condemned this position Maintaining the sanctity of liberal institutions in times of crisis amounted, to providing left cover for the bourgeoisie at the moment when a transformational rupture was necessary and maybe even daresay possible. I would also argue that the reaction appearing at the global scale is symptomatic of the erosion of U.S. imperial hegemony and the shift in the global order. The economic basis of the U.S. shifted from industrial capital to speculative finance, from productive dominance to crisis management. Trump’s rejection of liberal multilateralism and embrace of America First is a predictable consequence of imperial decline. The appeal of strongman rule, informal networks, and the breakdown of administrative capacity reflects the contradictions of late-stage imperialism.
Ok but 1) we are far from a revolutionary rupture in a socialist sense (though closer in a fascist one!) and 2) in a US context any process of social transformation will need to entail a dialectical deepening of democracy both inside the state and in civil society (including economic democracy!). Meaning "democracy" in the most literal sense of "people power." The conditions of Tsarist Russia circa 1917 are not those of the United States in 2025.
If we are looking for historical analogies, a much more apt example of what a socialist "transformational rupture" looks like in a US context is post Civil War Reconstruction.
Bennett and LRN folks, an A+ for putting the pieces together and coming up with patronal autocracy. I had concluded earlier this year and published on my Bpress site as an "unpublished paper" my own taxonomy, on which I've been working academically since 2008, that my row five should be called Patrimonialism, and there are versions of it on the right, moderate/liberal, progressive and left. Trump is in box 17, but per Poulantzas there are "regions" of the state, and your work like mind is imperfect in that is is part a typology of ideology and part an typology of state forms, but the state is not unitary. In the present administration, Vance with his backer Thiel is in box 5 but he has "extraconstitutional" tendencies and may end up in box 13, or Trump plus Vance may end up with the administration in box 13, not wanna be fascist but actually fascist. The danger is real. Dover, M. A. (2025 [2008]). Reconceptualizing the Political Spectrum with A Taxonomy of Five Versions of Conservative, Moderate/Liberal, Progressive and Left Ideology: Utopianism, Libertarianism, Pragmatism, Authoritarianism and Patrimonialism https://works.bepress.com/michael-dover/95/
Thanks Michael, look forward to taking a look! Excited to be developing more precise taxonomies to meet this moment.
The concept of “patronal autocracy” helps describe recent authoritarian trends, particularly the personalization of power and the erosion of liberal norms. However, this framework is limited by its liberal assumptions, which treat authoritarianism as a breakdown of institutional norms rather than as a structural response to crisis within capitalism. It does not engage the core insights of Marxist theory or confront the explicitly fascist theorists who shaped modern authoritarianism. Carl Schmitt, a Nazi jurist and open fascist, argued that sovereignty lies in the power to decide on the exception, not in adherence to legal norms. His theory shows how fascism emerges not outside liberalism, but from within it by suspending legality in moments of crisis. In this light, Trump’s contempt for bureaucracy, rule by loyalty, and disregard for institutional independence are not deviations but logical expressions of liberal constitutionalism under stress.
At the same time, it might be more accurate to understand Trumpism not as fully realized fascism but as a variant of proto-fascism. Like historical fascist movements, it mobilizes the petty bourgeoisie and disoriented sectors of the working class through racialized nationalism, authoritarian populism, and anti-left demagoguery. However, it lacks the disciplined mass party structure, totalitarian aspirations, and fully articulated ideological program of classical fascism. In this sense, Trumpism echoes what Togliatti described as fascism’s early phase, where bourgeois democracy is still used as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation . Some have described such formations as “illiberal democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” or “soft authoritarianism,” but these terms often downplay the class content of what is unfolding. Fascism is not a style of governance but a specific mode of capitalist rule that emerges in a time of crisis.
Lenin insisted that the state, whether democratic or authoritarian in form, is always an instrument of class domination. From this perspective, Trumpism’s ideological incoherence is a strength, not a weakness. It allows the movement to serve capital flexibly while mobilizing a mass base through culture war, conspiracy, and revanchist nationalism. What appears inconsistent from a liberal standpoint is, from a another perspective, the functional ideology of crisis capitalism.
Strategies that rely on liberal institutions, civil society, or procedural guardrails fail to reckon with the class nature of the state. Fascism often grows with the passive support or active collaboration of liberal elites. Preventing its consolidation requires more than defending democracy in the abstract. It demands the construction of a revolutionary project rooted in working-class power. Power that can offer not just resistance to creeping fascism, but an alternative to capitalism itself.
Thanks for this Steve! Will try and respond in more depth later, but quickly: I agree there are limitations to the "class blindness" of many political science-based taxonomies of authoritarianism, patronalization, autocracy, etc - I tried to at least briefly address them in the article.
I appreciate you distinguishing "phases" of fascism. Some of the arguments around "is Trump fascist?" (which I confess I've found tiring) have tended to revolve around an either/or, black-or-white framework. All of which to say, we need a taxonomy of stages of fascism as well. And I think we agree that Trumpism is certainly in some stage of attempted fascism. We might quibble about exactly which/where but that's a subject for another post.
We need to supplement Lein with Poulantzas: the state is a terrain of class struggle, and its internal fissures and balance of power reflect that of the broader social struggle. So overly straightforward to call is simply an object of domination. The defense of the democratic institutions is also partially a defense of the (limited) gains that the movements of workers, people of color and oppressed groups were able to make, as reflected within the state. So we cannot divorce defense of liberal institutions, civil society, etc from the kind of struggle you're talking about.